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Introduction
Over the past several years, India has progressively liberalised its foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. As a result, in most sectors, foreign investors can hold 100 per cent of the equity in firms registered in India. Restrictions that remain on foreign ownership are imposed in two ways: one, foreign investors are not allowed to invest in 11 sectors 1 , while some others, most of which are in the services sectors, are subjected to ceilings on FDI and/or specific government approval. The justification for the same could vary depending upon the sector but includes inter alia the desire to retain a certain degree of control over the operations of the investee companies in Indian hands and Of late, however, the government has indicated its intent to relax the caps in a number of sectors, including defence and retail trade. 6 Earlier, discussion has also taken place in case of the broadcasting sector. Also, the proposal to increase the FDI limit from 26 per cent to 49 per cent in the insurance sector is pending. Given that the increase in foreign participation is now being proposed in sensitive sectors, and in reversal of the policies wherein the government was reluctant to cede control to foreign entities for fear of marginalisation of the Indian entities, it is imperative to understand the implications of imposing the caps on FDI. In our view, corporate control is a phenomenon that seems easy to perceive, but can manifest in several different ways in its actualisation, which can easily cause a gap between expectations and experiences. This paper is an attempt to 2 For example, restrictions are imposed on the entry of foreign firms in defence with a view to strengthening self-reliance in defence preparedness. 
Does Right to Appoint Majority Directors Always Imply Control?
According to the CFP, further investments in other Indian companies by all those Indian companies which are owned and controlled by Indians will be treated as fully Indian. For this purpose, the main criteria adopted are that (i) the Indian company should be majority owned by Indians 7 (who should also act in concert) 8 and (ii) Indians should have the right to appoint majority of the directors. This is irrespective of the fact that the investing company might be having foreign equity up to 49.99 per cent. On the face of it, this may appear to be the correct approach because a majority in equity means that nominees of majority equity shareholders get elected to the board who in turn would manage the company's affairs according to the wishes of those who had elected them. This has two dimensions: at the level of shareholders and at the board level.
First of all, ownership of majority equity shares need not necessarily ensure automatic ability to get through decisions at the annual general meetings. Special resolutions require a much larger percentage than a simple majority. Secondly, directors are not always elected at the general meetings of shareholders. It is only in the absence of special provisions majority owners can elect their nominees to all board positions on offer at general meetings. Special provisions can enable certain shareholders, notwithstanding their share in equity, to have a minimum number of directors nominated to the boards. The second is the possibility of companies issuing different categories of shares with differential voting rights-some even having no voting rights at all. 9 A majority ownership of equity capital may thus not always automatically translate into majority voting rights and majority in the Board. 10 The CFP does recognise this possibility of 7 Excluding the shares held by public sector banks and public financial institutions.
8 This is to avoid the possibility of splitting of Indian owned votes which could give the foreign shareholder the upper hand in spite of being in minority. Interestingly, Section 6A(2) of the Insurance Act, 1938 expressly states that the "the voting right of every shareholder of any public company as aforesaid shall in all cases be strictly proportionate to the paid-up amount of the shares held by him" thus prohibiting shares with differential voting rights. 10 Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt Ltd is reported to have issued non-voting rights to Indian shareholders and company Employee Trusts, to meet the obligation of issuing 49 per cent shares to domestic entities while retaining 100 per cent control. See for instance: Sridhar (2003) and Guha Thakurtha (2005) . Though our understanding of the nature of shares issued to Indian contd… differential voting rights and special rights enjoyed by certain shareholders affecting decision-making (which includes election of directors) at annual general meetings when it states:
In any sector/activity, where Government approval is required for foreign investment and in cases where there are any inter-se agreements between/amongst shareholders which have an effect on the appointment of the Board of Directors or on the exercise of voting rights or of creating voting rights disproportionate to shareholding or any incidental matter thereof, such agreements will have to be informed to the approving authority. The approving authority will consider such inter-se agreements for determining ownership and control when considering the case for granting approval for foreign investment. (emphasis added)
The major limitation of this approach, though it is better than looking at a simple majority in equity shares, is that it still relies on majority in the board. It does not address the second and more critical question of how a company's board, which is the main operational body, functions. Boards determine the policy, strategy and operational matters. Hence in more ways than one, the board's role is more decisive than that of the general body of shareholders.
Special Provisions Could Nullify Majority in the Board
It has been recognised for long that corporate "control is not an easy thing to define, and the dividing line between some control and no control is arbitrary". 11 Legal provisions can only provide some broad parameters. As noted above, ownership of majority equity is taken as a sufficient condition for unambiguous control because under company law most decisions taken in general meetings and election of directors are based on simple majority of the shares represented by those participating in the meeting. However, special provisions can also bestow control of varying degrees even to those owning minority shares. (See Hymer (1993) . The Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (ILPIC) defined it as 'effective equity' for classifying a company into a business group (calculated after excluding the shares held by public financial institutions from the total) 40
Under FERA foreign branches and subsidiaries were asked to reduce the level of foreign equity to 40% thereby implying companies with up to 40% foreign equity would be treated as domestic companies. 49
Another important cap on FDI in certain restricted sectors. The objective is to have majority shares (51%) in Indian hands. 50.01
Simple majority. Sufficient to get through all ordinary resolutions as also in the absence of proportional/cumulative voting, can elect all the directors open for election. 51
Minimum government shareholding required under the Companies Act, 1956 to be classified as a government company 74 This is the upper limit allowed where 100% FDI is not permitted. This is the counterpart of 26%. Indian shareholders with 26% shareholding will be in a position, if they so desire, to block special resolutions. 100
Wholly-owned. Some Distorting Factors i. Special rights can change the relationship in favour of minority shareholders irrespective of the extent of their voting rights. ii. Another manner in which the percentages can lose their significance is the deployment of differential voting rights. ii. The situation would also be dependent upon the distribution of remaining shareholding. This is more so in case of listed companies. If such agreements, coupled with dependence on the foreign investor for technology, brand names and market development (including buybacks which could be a very important consideration in case of the defence sector) are entered into, then the control implied in the majority equity and majority in the board may have little relevance in practice.
The following cases help understand this possibility better. Under the existing provisions, foreign equity is restricted to 26 per cent in the insurance sector. In the equity share capital of Max New York Life Insurance Co Ltd (MaxLife) Max India Ltd has 74 per cent share and New York Life International of US (NYLI) has the remaining 26 per cent stake thus conforming to the FDI cap applicable to the insurance sector. The Articles of Association (AoA) of Max Life stipulate that out of the total 10 directors of the company, Max India is entitled to appoint 7 directors to the Max Life's Board, NYLI two (nonretiring) directors and the remaining one will be filled up by the Max Life's CEO. On the face of it, Max India has far larger number of directors on MaxLife's board who also constitute majority. But when it comes to forming quorum at board meetings of MaxLife at least one director each nominated by Max India and NYLI should be present. And for taking certain decisions by the company and any of its subsidiaries (each a Relevant Company), "... shall require prior approval by a majority of the board of directors of the Relevant company, which majority must include at least one (1) director appointed by Max India and one (1) appointed by NYLI ..
. (emphasis added) 14
12 See for instance, Goyal (1979) and Goyal (1982) . 13 Dhar (1988) An inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the SPV has been created to get around the existing regulations and AXA was not prepared to settle for the 26 per cent share.
In the case of Tata-AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd also we found that the 26 per cent FDI limit has no operational significance as the articles give the foreign investor special rights. We did access the AoAs of Birla Sun Life Insurance Co Ltd and Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co Ltd also. However, these not being the latest, we are not in a position to express any opinion as far as the control mechanism written into the AoAs by the collaborating parties.
It is evident that the CFP does not address the issue of functioning of the corporate boards in joint ventures. As the experience of dilution of foreign equity under FERA suggests, use of special rights and veto powers has been a very old practice. Interestingly, subsequent a news report on the special rights enjoyed by foreign investors in insurance joint ventures, based on our ongoing study of FDI 18 , in the context of formulating guidelines for insurance IPOs it was reported that "... no joint venture will be able to go public without the foreign partner losing its veto power in the joint venture". 19 One is not, however, clear of how such rights be treated in case of unlisted JVs. Secondly, will the Indian partner be allowed to sell his entire stake in the open market after the company is listed and the lock-in-period, if any, is over leaving the foreign investor as the single largest investor in the company? In any case, it is surprising why the CFP missed this important and well known aspect of corporate control.
Do Veto Rights of Minority Shareholders Amount to Control?
That the interpretation of veto rights in board meetings has become a contentious issue is evident from the fact that the issue is currently engaging the attention of the highest judicial body of the country. Since the appellant (Subhkam) has the power to nominate only one director, that nominee can, by no stretch of reasoning, exercise control over the affairs of the target company or control its board of directors. That single nominee would be in a microscopic minority and he has no veto powers. It is the admitted case of the parties that the target company is a Board managed company and the overall control of that company vests with the board of directors. ... Having carefully gone through each and every sub-clause of clause 9 (which lists the matters to be decided with the nominee director's consent), we are of the view that it means what it says. The various sub-clauses are meant only to protect the interest of the acquirer (appellant) and the investment made by it. ... The list of matters provided in clauses 9(a) to 9(o) are not in the nature of day to day operational control over the business of the target company. So also, they are not in the nature of control over either the management or policy decisions of the target company. These provisions merely enable the acquirer to oppose a proposal and not carry any proposal on its bidding. 20
Notwithstanding SAT's position it is evident that in all strategic matters, the investee company's promoters' hands are tied. They cannot decide on a business plan nor can they appoint even key officials of the company. One interpretation could be that the investee company's board has only to endorse what the investing company wishes. Otherwise there will be a stalemate. While the SAT did not deem the powers to be veto powers, there is every possibility of the veto powers being interpreted as amounting to some sort of control in this regard. It is relevant to refer in this context to the European Commission's competition policy which states that:
Joint control exists where two or more undertakings or persons have the possibility of exercising decisive influence over another undertaking. Decisive influence in this sense normally means the power to block actions which determine the strategic commercial behaviour of an undertaking. Unlike sole control, which confers the power upon a specific shareholder to determine the strategic decisions in an undertaking, joint control is characterized by the possibility of a deadlock situation resulting from the power of two or more parent companies to reject proposed strategic decisions. It follows, therefore, that these shareholders must reach a common understanding in determining the commercial policy of the joint venture (emphasis added). 21
Van Bael & Bellis, a Brussels-based leading law firm concurs by saying that
Generally, where the support of the minority shareholder is needed to make decisions concerning the undertaking's business plan and annual budget and to appoint management, such a minority shareholder will be considered to jointly control the undertaking, regardless of the fact that it may be significantly less represented on the board than the majority shareholder and may have no ability to influence other less important decisions of the undertaking. 22
It would also be relevant to refer to the SEBI Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee which noted that ... given the case-specific nature of "control" as a concept, the Committee decided to refrain from stipulating whether the power to say "no" would constitute "control" for purposes of the Takeover Regulations. Whether a person has acquired control by virtue of affirmative rights would therefore have to be discerned from the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. ... the definition of "control" be modified to include "ability" in addition to "right" to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions would constitute control (sic). 23 expands the ambit of control from mere majority in the board. There is thus not only going to be a high degree of subjective element in determining control and the objectivity of the authorities is going to be crucial in ascertaining the same but one can expect considerable litigation by the interested parties.
From the foregoing it becomes obvious that the CFP's emphasis on the right to appoint majority directors as the final indicator of control is based on inadequate appreciation of corporate law and practices and is bound to help foreign investors in exercising greater control than what is intended to be permitted to them. This indeed raises doubts about the efficacy of the sectoral caps, especially high stakes like 74 per cent in case of telecommunications, themselves. Interestingly, some of the Indian partners of the large telecom companies are multinational in nature and it would be difficult to visualise where their interests lie and where does control lie.
Need for Clarity in Objectives
This brings us to the fundamental question. What is the objective of allowing FDI in 'sensitive' areas? Is it to attract foreign capital and technology so that the sectors would grow fast and efficiently? If this is the case, then sectoral limits on FDI could obviously act as major deterrent for foreign investors. The second is about the imposition of sectoral caps. Is it to help retain control in the hands of Indians so that national interests and sensitivities could be well protected? Is it to enable domestic entrepreneurs gain strength? Or, is it to prevent higher degree of foreign ownership per se and thus prevent large outflows in the form of dividends? If the latter alone is the issue, there is no logic in allowing FDI in these areas in the first place. Attracting larger volumes of FDI cannot at all be a consideration for opening up such sectors. 24 Since retaining some control in Indian hands appears to be the main objective, the following points may be in order. Given the fact that there is no explicit restriction on the extent of foreign control at the entry point whenever entry through the automatic route is allowed, as complete reliance is placed on percentage shares, the subsequent effort at limiting control through 23 Securities and Exchange Board of India (2010) monitoring indirect foreign equity would be of no use. Even in the case of defence sector, for which the government's approval is mandatory, the CFP, while elaborating on the indirect foreign equity, only says that the present limit of 26 per cent is subject to the condition inter alia that, "(T)he management of the applicant company/partnership should be in Indian hands with majority representation on the Board as well as the Chief Executives of the company/partnership firm being resident Indians", thus relying on the nationality of the directors and their majority in the board. Obviously, simply looking at the nationality of the directors one is likely to misjudge the character of a company's board of directors and oblivious to the constraints under which they would be working.
It should also be underlined that in cases where the foreign contribution to the risk capital is low at 26 per cent and the remaining has to be mobilised by the Indian partner himself, he would opt for foreign collaboration mainly to derive substantial advantages in terms of technology, goodwill, etc. This places him at a disadvantage in negotiating with the foreign partner and thus he is more likely to accede control over operations and strategy to the foreign investor. The disproportionate control of the boards conceded to the foreign partners in the insurance JVS clearly points out to this. On the other hand, a serious foreign investor would try to keep control by all means as the joint venture came into being mainly because of the restrictive FDI regime in the absence of which he would most probably have opted for a wholly owned venture. The takeover by the foreign partner of many JVs over the years is a clearly points to this possibility. His other main reason for entering into JV could be to take advantage of the partner's knowledge of local market conditions, network and political connections which are important but not always critical to the venture. An additional point that needs to be kept in mind is that the Indian partner need not always act in national interest or believe in sectoral sensitivities. Commercial interests may prevail over national and social obligations. It is always going to be difficult to achieve the twin objectives of attracting FDI along with the attendant benefits of technology while simultaneously retaining control in Indian hands. It should be underlined that the DIPP discussion paper "Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Defence Sector" argues for increasing the foreign stake in equity to 74 per cent from 26 per cent as "higher FDI limit would also provide a significant incentive for transfer of know-how/technology to the country". 25 Obviously, in such a situation only a stringent obligation, if at all, can protect national interest, especially because the Indian party cannot have majority on the board, he would also not have the capacity to prevent most decisions at the annual meetings. Alternatively, the government should think of holding 'golden shares' in such ventures.
14

Summing Up
The issue of indirect control came into focus because of the restriction on the extent of foreign equity imposed for certain sectors. The Consolidated FDI Policy of 2010 places emphasis on majority ownership and right to appoint majority directors for defining a domestic company. There is evidence to show that the sectoral caps, if these are aimed at restricting the extent of control yielded by foreign investors as a means of protecting national interest/objectives, can be defeated in practice through shareholder agreements/rights written into AoA as has been seen in case of the insurance sector. It is an acknowledged fact that relative strengths of the partners determines the extent of control in joint ventures and the dominant partner has many avenues to impose his will.
Even if a foreign entity cannot own a majority of a joint venture, it may be able to legally obtain operational control through other means. One may surround the joint venture with contractual obligations to the foreign venturer. For example, if the joint venture is to assemble components manufactured in the United States, the U.S. investor retains significant control over the joint venture regardless of how many shares the investor owns or how many directors it can name to the board because it controls the supply of components. Similarly, a U.S. investor can exercise control through supply contracts, marketing agreements, management contracts, and veto power in the joint venture agreements. (emphasis added) 26 In policy-induced JVs, the foreign partner is more likely to deploy all possible means to run the enterprise as if it was a wholly-owned one by reducing the local one to a sleeping partner. Even going by the European Commission's interpretation of the rights secured by minority shareholders through AoA or shareholder agreements the situation can at best be joint control and at worst be sole control by the foreign minority shareholders given the dependence of domestic partners. Given such a scenario, the monitoring of indirect FDI envisaged by the CFP, would hardly make a difference to the extent of control enjoyed by the foreign investor.
At the other extreme, when foreign equity up to 74 per cent is allowed considerable control has already been yielded. Given the dependence of local partner on the foreign partner for critical inputs, it is a moot point to what extent the former will be able to influence the venture's operation by taking advantage of the 26 per cent shareholding. In the absence of express conditions that the 26 per cent should be held by a single Indian entity or entities having binding common interests even this expected protection would prove illusory. 27 This is irrespective of the fact whether the local partner, especially if he has substantial international businesses, would give priority to national interests. Given the manner in which funds are being raised and group operations are (proposed to be) being organised by some Indian business groups, but for their original nationality, there is nothing to suggest that national interest could be more important for them than their own personal business interests.
It is evident that India has not learnt much from her own FERA dilution experience as also from the overwhelming international evidence. As long as foreign investment up to a certain level is allowed under the automatic route, the foreign investor can opt for binding clauses which can give him absolute control. It does not matter whether the indirect investment route which he wishes to exploit to increase control/shareholding and which the government aims to monitor has similar clauses or not. Any scrutiny at the second level thus becomes redundant as far as control by the foreign investor is concerned. Control is the crux of the matter and it cannot be measured by percentages like 26 or 49 and proportion of directors in the board. The minimum that should be done is to disallow veto powers, withdraw automatic route facility for such sectors and follow a case-by-case approach. The government should also consider holding golden shares in all companies operating in sectors considered highly sensitive from national security and public health point of view. Before proceeding further with the regulation of indirect foreign equity, there is obviously a need for the government to specify the objectives in placing caps in each sector and also to study how the present caps are working in practice at all stages. The CFP should elaborate on this in its next revision.
